ABSTRACT: As Virginia Held, Larry May and Torbjörn Tännsjö have argued, it can be plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively, if this would be needed to prevent some harm. On the other hand it is commonly assumed that (collective) agency is a necessary condition for (collective) responsibility. I
Introduction
In an influential article from 1970, Virginia Held claims that it can be reasonable to hold "a random collection of individuals", collectively responsible for omitting to take collective action. Later advocates of this view are Larry May (1990) and Torbjörn Tännsjö (2005) . 1 The position they defend involves the positive assumption (which I shall not question) that groups can be held responsible in a non-reductive sense, i.e. in a sense clearly distinct from a mere elliptical summation of judgments about the responsibility of individuals. A second important feature of their view is that a set of individuals can be morally responsible even if the set is "loosely structured", as May puts it. 2 The morally responsible set need not have a common decision procedure, let alone be formally constituted as a group. On the contrary, its blameworthy failure might be precisely that it did not constitute itself as a group, or adopt a decision-procedure, if any of this would have been needed to prevent some harm.
May, Held and Tännsjö explicitly reject the idea that a common decision procedure is necessary for a group as such to become a proper target for moral blame. This negative claim means that some standard ways of grounding collective responsibility are inapplicable. Advocates of collective responsibility differ in their characterizations of the features they take to be essential to groups of the kind that sensibly can be held morally responsible. However, almost all proceed from some distinction between, on one side, conglomerate, corporate, or joint activities, and on the other side, aggregates or mere collections of individual acts. In different ways, they attempt to show that a set of individuals that performs the first kind of activities can be regarded as a collective agent, and therefore become a target for meaningful moral blame or praise. In the present case, though, we cannot argue with philosophers like Peter French or Phillip Pettit that these sets of passive individuals are proper objects of assignments of moral responsibility because they can be regarded as continuous corporate agents.
In order for a set of individuals to be such an agent, it must at least have a procedure for collective decision-making.
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It is less clear whether Held and May also would reject weaker conditions for collective agency as prerequisites for collective responsibility in these cases, such as shared intentions (Bratman) or joint commitments (Gilbert). 4 Stanley Bates points out that the thought experiments from which Held draws her conclusions all concern groups that have at least an informal decision procedure and discuss possible common courses of actions. 5 David Copp thinks that May should have conceded that "a collective cannot be responsible for a failure to act unless it has the characteristics that prerequisite for collective action". 6 On the face of it, nothing in Held's or May's positions appears to prevent the The worry about unfairness that Tännsjö's analogy was meant to relieve stems from a thick notion of moral responsibility, which (as Mill noted) is central to our moral practices. In this thick sense, moral responsibility is essentially connected to the justifiability of blame and other moral sanctions. 9 Moreover, as Strawson, Gibbard and others have stressed, moral (unlike at least some legal) sanctions have an essentially "involving" character. 10 They should be such that they at least in principle could be justified in terms of reasons that could appeal to the subject 9 Mill, Utilitarianism, ch.5.
blamed. Part of their efficiency stems from the implicit assumption that when you receive them, you are supposed to understand that you do so because you have performed a certain action willingly and knowingly. Like James Rachels and others, I believe that our use of this moral tool can be justified, regardless of whether our overall justification of moral practices is consequentialist or non-consequentialist. 11 It might be debated whether this notion of moral responsibility is essential to all moral practices. 12 But we should at least admit with Gibbard that morality in the sense delimited by Mill is a "central region in our moral thought". In this sense of morality, to refute guilt, blame and other essentially moral sanctions is to "deny that anything is ever morally reprehensible".
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The question discussed throughout this paper is whether certain types of groups should be held morally responsible in the mentioned thick sense.
However, proponents of collective moral responsibility often separate moral responsibility from justifiability of sanctions, probably to avoid unpalatable implications concerning collective punishment. 14 Unless it is 14 Virginia Held ends her list of possible conditions for responsibility with the suggestion "which I shall not employ" that if these other conditions are fulfilled, then the agent deserves blame. (Held, V "Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?", p.474) Deborah Tollefsen's argument for collective responsibility explicitly presupposes that issues of moral responsibility can be pursued independently of the problems about punishment. ("Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility", Philosophical Explorations vol. VI, no 3 2003, p.220.) Others have suggested that in assigning collective responsibility, we employ a distinct notion of 'responsibility,' distinguished from the ordinary one made clear that this strategy requires us to employ a thinner notion of moral responsibility, clearly distinct from the concept that is typically focussed in the discourse on moral responsibility, I find that maneuver misleading. It risks making assignments of moral responsibility toothless.
To hold a collective morally responsible (in the thick sense) for some harm is to imply that moral sanctions are in place. That, in turn, presupposes that the subject is deserving of sanctions for what it has done, on account of something it has done intentionally. So, moral responsibility in this sense simply presupposes agency. Moreover, since collective sanctions inevitably strike individual members, our method for delimiting the collective agent that is morally responsible for a specific harm should be such that it picks individuals that justifiably can be blamed for what the group has done. In that sense, collective responsibility presupposes coresponsibility. In this matter, I dissent from Margaret Gilbert, who thinks that judgments of collective responsibility have no implications either way for judgments about members' responsibility.
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'Co-responsibility' is distinct from 'individual responsibility' in the standard sense. A person may be co-responsible for an effect of a group's behavior without being responsible for any intentional marginal contribution to that effect. 16 To say that an individual is co-responsible is to imply that she/he is morally tainted or compromised by the overall effect of the group's behavior. In that sense, the relation between collective responsibility and co-responsibility is "top-down". contrasted wit the direction of the relation between a set of judgments about individual responsibility in the standard sense (for intentional marginal contribution) and a summative judgment about that sort of responsibility.
In popular debate, it is common to identify membership in morally relevant groups with salient shared features like ethnicity, nationality, or sex. Heterogenous sets of people like "whites", "Germans", or "men" are seen as bearers of moral responsibility. These broad categories may refer to sets of individuals without any form of unifying attitudes or commitments.
However, few people take seriously the idea that these categories are morally significant by themselves. In order to make claims of this kind plausible, one usually attempts to show that members of these collectives are united in some other trait that is morally relevant: that members at least share some attitude such that it explains the harm or injustice for which the collective is blamed. We need a link between the individual and the group's act, allowing us to separate co-responsible members of the relevant group from innocent bystanders who may have been causally involved through no fault of their own.
So, in the collective omission-cases, are there any positive features that enable us to regard these collectives as agents, as well as to delimit the groups in a way that justifies moral sanctions striking the individual members? If no such features can be found, I think we should dismiss the idea of holding collectives to account for not acting jointly.
Collective agents as mere sums of individuals?
Tännsjö's analogy between collective responsibility and strict liability would allow him to disregard the question of whether collectives can be intentionally acting agents. Nevertheless, he also sketches a weak notion of collective action, such that any randomly delimited collection of individual actions will fulfill it. He finds it possible to regard any set of individuals as a collective agent, independently of whether they share any attitudes or are unified in some other sense. We can delimit these sets in any way we want, for purposes of efficient sanctions. "There is no limit to what collectivities we are allowed to countenance as mereological sums, it seems to me." This seems to imply that we may infer a group's decision merely from information about the member's attitudes. The existence of discursive dilemmas of the kind discussed by Philip Pettit and others appears to falsify that view. 19 A vector representing the beliefs and desires of the members of a population will not provide full information about which acts or decisions the population will undertake. Retrospectively, the vector will not suffice to explain the path they chose. A set of individual beliefs and desires explain a group's action only given some assumption about their procedure for collective decision-making. Which act follows from a set of beliefs and desires depends on whether the group decides by dictatorship, unanimity, majority, or some other rule or less formal practice. Even if we know that this specific group practices, say, majority voting, we may also need to know whether their vote is premise-based or conclusion-based. As Pettit points out, we cannot solve these problems by inferring the group's choice of decision procedure solely from information about the individuals' beliefs and preferences on decision procedures, on pain of infinite regress. In other words, complete information about the members' individual beliefs and desires is not sufficient to explain the action of a collectivity.
Moreover, our ability to delimit the relevant sets of omissions appears to be undermined by the lack of a more substantial criterion of collective agency. How do we determine which these sets are to begin with? If no one has prevented a specific harm, there is no limit to the set of individuals that are causally involved in that harm. Unless we admit that membership in the morally responsible group has to do with features that link individuals to some relevant decision or intention explaining the set of not doings, everyone will be a member of that group.
Joint omissions
It should be clear by now that what I am after is a notion of collective agency, weak enough to accommodate collective omission-cases but nevertheless strong enough to substantiate judgments about collective moral responsibility in the thick sense. We need a way of distinguishing joint omissions from mere sets of not doings.
On the approach to collective action that I favor, the distinction between such actions and mere sets of intertwined or interdependent acts should be drawn in terms of the content of the participant's attitudes. This is a claim that the theories by Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and
Christopher Kutz, have in common. 20 In my version of that approach, in order for you to be a member of the group that performs a collective action, you have to conceive of the intended activity as collective. This means that you regard the group "as a body", to use Gilbert's phrase, or as a "unit of activity", to borrow a term from Susan Hurley. 21 You must regard yourself as part of a unit of causal agency. Moreover, that conception must figure in attitudes that explain your behavior. When a group's behavior is explained in the right way by this sort of individual attitudes, it is a collective action.
This view of collective actions is less demanding than Bratman's, Kutz's or Gilbert's. That difference is of relevance for the treatment of collective omission cases.
Elsewhere I offer a more detailed account of the analysis, but here is a brief sketch. 22 The notion of collective activity that has to figure in the content of the individual attitudes that explain a collective action reflects a purely causal notion of agency that we employ in daily life when we say Collective omissions by loosely structured sets of individuals are not likely to fulfill this stronger condition. Consider Held's example of a group that should be held responsible for failing to make a decision about how to help a victim that no individual is able to rescue alone. While they argue, the victim bleeds to death. It would seem farfetched to assume that they conceive of what they are doing -neglecting the victim -as a jointly intentional act. That would require each of them to have an intention or commitment in the content of which each participant's intending or being committed to neglecting the victim figures. In a situation like this, it seems more likely that they simply try to consider the group's causal capacities and options but fail to act together.
Held (like May on similar cases) stresses the negative facts of the case: the group fails to adopt a formal decision procedure; they do not choose a representative to act on their behalf, etc. I think that one crucial element that is necessary to make the assignment of collective responsibility proper is the positive fact that the individual participants apparently consider options from the group perspective, and act wrongly with respect to those options. In that weak sense, they jointly fail to act together. There is a small but important difference between that sort of group failure and a mere set of parallel individual not doings.
This view of one of the prerequisites for collective responsibility also provides a way of understanding how collective blame and punishment that strikes individual members could be justified. Although the decision of the group need not reflect directly the preferences of its members, the set of members consist of those whose actions with respect to the group's alternatives are explained by considerations in which the group's options figures. Therefore it may be fair to regard them as co-responsible and as proper objects of moral sanctions.
This may be consistent with not finding them individually responsible in the standard sense. There may be no ground for assuming that any single individual omission could be regarded as an intentional marginal contribution to the victim's death, given the behavior of other members.
Consider again the injured victim under the girder. Suppose that you and I were the only ones who knew about this accident, and that we could have helped if we had acted together. The mere fact that none of us did anything about it would in my view not be sufficient for holding the group as such responsible. There may be various reasons for the fact that no collective effort took place. These reasons will be crucial to how moral responsibility should be measured out.
Maybe we were completely prevented from communicating, and thereby unable to co-ordinate our actions. Although it is still true that we could have helped if we had acted together, we could not form a unit of causal agency. In that case, no one should be blamed for the tragic circumstances that led to the victim's death.
On the other hand, the explanation might be that one or both of us simply refused to consider the group's options, i.e. to think about what we could do together. Then, each non-cooperator should be held individually responsible for the consequences of not seeking co-operation. We would individually be guilty of breaching the principle Donald Regan calls Cooperative utilitarianism, according to which the right thing to do "is to cooperate, with whoever else is co-operating, in the production of the best consequences possible given the behaviour of non-co-operators." 25 The point of this criterion of rightness is to stress that we never have the right to take the behaviour or attitudes of other people as given among the standing conditions. I am individually responsible for the consequences of my refusing to consider the options we would have as a group.
A third variation on the case might be that we both considered which options the group had as one unit of causal agency, and that we both agreed that a sudden simultaneous wrench would do the trick, but that we could not agree upon whether to do the tug on "three" or "ten". While we argued about this, the victim died. This case would be similar to Held's example.
Like Held, I find it reasonable to think that the group might be morally responsible in such a case. together, and of persuading others to join them in the intention to rise in revolt. Eventually, that could lead to sufficiently forceful joint action.
Then, I would say, these specific members are individually morally responsible for not initiating this process. Some subgroups may also be collectively responsible for the effects of their joint omissions. But still, there need not be any blameworthy failure on the part of the entire population as such. This collective may have no unifying attitudes regarding revolution, and in that case there is no moral group fault committed by the whole population.
In order for you to be a co-responsible member of the group that jointly omits to overthrow your country's regime, some of your actions must at least be explained by attitudes in the content of which the collective in question figures as the unit of causal agency. That is a minimal prerequisite for endorsing or accepting the collective behavior. That sort of endorsement may conflict with the attitudes that explain your behavior with reference to individual options. There is simply no guarantee that the choices you will make with reference to the group's options are such that they coincide with the choices you would make when concentrating on the options that lie within your own causal powers.
Consider, finally, some popular views about collective responsibility, such as the collective responsibility, at least by omission, of men (for the oppression of women) or a generation of Germans (for the Holocaust).
How should we go about to examine the plausibility of such claims? To begin with, we should try to find out whether these expressions are really meant to be about collective responsibility in the non-reductive sense.
Some of those who bring forward these claims probably want to say that each member of the group is individually responsible for intentionally contributing to the harm in question, at least by omission.
If we want to understand whether they might be true as claims about the groups as such, we should, firstly, delimit the relevant group by considering causal involvement, bearing in mind the epistemic and causal complications that might make a simple "but for" test unfeasible. The alternative to taking on this work is to allow for arbitrariness and insecurity in the practices of moral blame and punishment.
Secondly, we should investigate the attitudes that explain the 
